Microsoft 365 Zero Trust Assessment & Remediation
Review identity, device, application, data and threat controls as an interconnected system.
Zero Trust is not a single Microsoft 365 feature and it is not achieved by enabling MFA alone.
Identity, devices, applications, data and threat signals must work together to make access decisions and limit the impact of compromise.
This assessment examines how those controls operate as a system.
What we assess
Identity
- Authentication methods
- MFA coverage
- Conditional Access
- Privileged roles
- Emergency access
- Identity risk controls
Devices
- Microsoft Intune enrollment
- Compliance
- Endpoint configuration
- Device trust
- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint integration
Applications and access
- Enterprise applications
- Application consent
- Access policies
- Guest/external access
- SaaS visibility
Data
- Microsoft Purview foundations
- Sensitivity classification
- Sharing controls
- Data Loss Prevention
- Information protection
Threat protection
- Microsoft Defender XDR integration
- Defender for Office 365
- Endpoint protection
- Identity threat signals
- Investigation and response readiness
Collaboration
- Exchange Online
- SharePoint Online
- OneDrive
- Microsoft Teams
- External collaboration
Operations
- Security monitoring
- Administrative separation
- Alert handling
- Incident readiness
- Change and exception management
What you receive
- Current control assessment
- Prioritized Zero Trust gaps
- Evidence-backed findings
- Remediation roadmap
- Quick wins
- Longer-term control improvements
- Post-remediation validation
Example public finding
This is an illustrative example, not a finding from a customer assessment.
MZT-023 — Privileged access does not consistently require stronger authentication controls
Observation
Administrative access exists across multiple Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Entra roles, but stronger authentication and privileged-access requirements are not applied consistently to all administrative paths.
Why it matters
Administrative identities can change security controls, access sensitive information and affect large parts of the tenant. Their protection should be stronger than ordinary user access.
Recommended direction
Identify all privileged roles and administrative paths, reduce standing privilege, require appropriate strong authentication, separate administrative identities from normal productivity activity, and validate emergency-access procedures.
Public methodology
Public material may include:
- Assessment domains
- High-level maturity model
- Control-family overview
- Sanitized sample findings
- Sample report
- Selected public checks
- Microsoft reference mapping
Environment-specific assessment details and remediation guidance are provided within the agreed project scope.